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Responding to Political Corruption: Some 
Institutional Considerations 
Jonathan L. Entin* 
Earlier this year, New York Times columnist Gail Collins asked which 
state has the most corrupt political culture.  As one might expect, she 
focused on the Empire State, where the governor who was elected in 
2006 was forced from office in a sex scandal, his successor is under 
several ethical clouds, and a state senator who was briefly involved in 
an abortive coup against his party’s leadership was expelled from the 
legislature after being convicted of domestic assault.1  In the end, 
though, she gave the nod to Illinois, where the governor elected in 2006 
was impeached and removed from office for misconduct and is now 
facing a retrial for allegedly trying to auction President Obama’s former 
U.S. Senate seat to the highest bidder, among other charges, and the 
Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor withdrew amid personal 
scandals.2  Many readers suggested that other states deserved 
consideration for this questionable honor.3 
As a native Bostonian, I would like to nominate Massachusetts for 
consideration.  My home state has the dubious distinction of having 
three consecutive Speakers of the House of Representatives indicted for 
felonies; two later pleaded guilty, while the third case is still pending (a 
fourth was indicted in 1964 but died before the case was resolved).4  
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.  Thanks to Brian 
Gran for helpful suggestions and to Judith Kaul and Lisa Peters for help in locating fugitive 
sources. 
1. Gail Collins, The Biggest Losers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at A33. 
2. Id.  This column focused on very recent developments.  It did not mention some legendary 
New York grafters such as Boss Tweed or Jimmy Walker, nor did it discuss former Illinois 
Governor George Ryan or the scandal that led to the withdrawal of Barack Obama’s original 
Republican opponent for the U.S. Senate in 2004. 
3. See Gail Collins, There’s Always California, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2010, at A23 (listing 
readers’ suggestions for the most politically corrupt state). 
4. Brian C. Mooney, Concentration of Power Held by Speaker Blamed as a Key Factor, BOS. 
GLOBE, June 3, 2009, at 11.  Of course, not all officials with criminal records are corrupt.  See, 
e.g., Calvin Trillin, U.S. Journal: Madison, Wisconsin—The Red Mayor and the Ideal Place, 
NEW YORKER, Dec. 3, 1973, at 150, 152 (noting that the arrests of members of a city council in 
connection with Vietnam War protests “might make the Eighth District of Madison the only 
aldermanic district in the country in which two consecutive incumbents have been arrested on 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734414
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Several members of Congress from the Bay State have also been 
convicted of corruption.5  In addition, Massachusetts has something of a 
tradition of reelecting imprisoned incumbents: James Michael Curley 
was returned to the Boston City Council by his constituents in 1904 
while serving a jail sentence for taking a civil service examination on 
behalf of a constituent;6 more than half a century later a state 
representative was reelected while serving a prison sentence for less 
altruistic misbehavior.7  Then there is the Governor’s Council, a curious 
body with roots in the colonial era that serves as an advisor to and 
occasional check on the governor8: among its powers, this body must 
approve the appointment of judges and a wide range of other officials,9 
as well as various public contracts and other expenditures not 
specifically authorized by the legislature.10  At one point during my 
youth, four of the eight members of the Governor’s Council were either 
in jail or under indictment, prompting my mother (who grew up in the 
Bronx) to observe: “The difference between New York and 
Massachusetts is that in New York the stealing is organized.”11 
charges that had nothing to do with stealing”). 
5. See Martin F. Nolan, In Mass., Prison Doesn’t Always Preclude One’s Future in Politics, 
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 30, 1992, at 34 (listing members of Congress from Massachusetts who have 
been reelected after a conviction on corruption charges). 
6. THOMAS H. O’CONNOR, THE BOSTON IRISH: A POLITICAL HISTORY 181–82 (1995); 
Charles H. Trout, Curley of Boston: The Search for Irish Legitimacy, in BOSTON 1700–1980: THE 
EVOLUTION OF URBAN POLITICS 165, 175–76 (Ronald P. Formisano & Constance K. Burns eds., 
1984).  Curley capped his political career in 1945 by winning his fourth term as mayor by a 
record margin even though he was under indictment for mail fraud on election day.  He was 
imprisoned for several months during that term but was pardoned by President Harry Truman.  
Although welcomed as a conquering hero on his return from the federal penitentiary in late 1947, 
Curley was defeated for reelection in 1949.  O’CONNOR, supra, at 209–12; Trout, supra, at 188–
89. 
7. See Nolan, supra note 5, at 34 (noting that Rep. Charles Iannello was reelected while 
imprisoned for larceny). 
8. MASS. CONST., pt. 2, ch. II, § III, art. I. 
9. Id. § I, art. IX; see also, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §§ 26 (board of commissioners 
on uniform state laws), 35 (state librarian), 70 (board of trustees of Holyoke soldiers’ home), 97 
(finance advisory board), 99 (boxers’ fund board), 101 (obscene literature control commission) 
(West 2006); id. ch. 13, §§ 39 (board of registration of barbers), 48 (board of registration of 
dispensing opticians), 54 (board of registration of real estate brokers and salesmen) (West 2002); 
id. ch. 22, § 11 (board of elevator regulations) (2002); id. ch. 23E, § 4 (industrial accident board) 
(West 2002). 
10. MASS. CONST., pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. XI. 
11. One of my high school classmates discovered a loophole in the state election law that did 
not require independent candidates for state office to be registered voters.  He promptly 
announced that he was running as an independent for the Governor’s Council.  The Secretary of 
State, the chief election officer, persuaded him to drop his quixotic effort and arranged to have the 
loophole closed by an embarrassed legislature. 
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This less-than-serious debate over the least honest political culture 
does have a serious point.  The existence of corruption confirms 
Madison’s observation: “If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.”12  Of course, if men (and women) are not angels, those who 
hold governmental authority are not angels, either.  Madison focused on 
institutional structures that would “enable the government to control the 
governed” while also “oblig[ing] it to control itself.”13  One important 
way to get the government to control itself is to address the problem of 
corruption. 
This paper focuses on corruption involving higher-level officials.  Of 
course, corruption can occur at every level of government and at every 
rank of officialdom.  But the corrosive effect of corruption at the top 
raises special concern.  As Justice Brandeis explained, “If the 
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”14  We can 
address this sort of corruption ex ante and ex post: through institutional 
mechanisms that are designed to prevent corruption in the first place, 
and through mechanisms designed to prosecute and punish corruption 
after it has already occurred.  Neither prevention nor prosecution has 
completely succeeded in eradicating political corruption.  The following 
discussion will examine and suggest the limitations of some institutional 
arrangements that have been developed to prevent and prosecute 
corruption.  The paper concludes by asking whether corruption, at least 
in moderation, might actually serve some socially useful function. 
I.  PREVENTION 
Among the institutional measures that have been proposed to prevent 
corruption are open meeting laws and term limits.  This section will 
address each of these approaches in turn. 
A.  Open Meeting Laws 
Open meeting laws are designed to compel the government to make 
most decisions in public.  Such laws exist at the federal level and in 
almost every state.15  Justice Brandeis offered a pithy justification for 
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
13. Id. 
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled 
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
15. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 11120–11132 (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 286.011–.0115 (West 2009); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1–
7.5 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A 1/2 (West 2001); N.Y. 
PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 100–111 (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 
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this approach: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social 
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.”16  The notion of open 
meetings promotes two complementary constitutional values: it 
encourages elected officials to act in the public interest rather than for 
their own private gain, and by permitting the citizenry at large to 
participate in the political process, it reduces the risk that factions will 
gain excessive influence over public policy.17 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the extent to which 
the Constitution might create a presumption of open legislative and 
executive sessions, it has recognized that the First Amendment provides 
a qualified right of public access to judicial proceedings.18  The Court’s 
reasoning in the cases involving judicial proceedings reflects many of 
the justifications advanced by proponents of open meeting laws.19  
First, openness promotes the appearance of fairness and enhances public 
confidence in the integrity of official proceedings.20  As Chief Justice 
Burger explained, “People in an open society do not demand infallibility 
from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are 
prohibited from observing.”21 
Second, public access can educate the citizenry in the workings of 
government, which in turn facilitates informed political discussion and 
debate.22  Open meetings in which officials address difficult issues of 
public policy can enlighten the public on the conflicting values and 
intractable trade-offs that affect the resolution of many problems, which 
(West Supp. 2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 551.001–.128 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.30.010–.920 (West 2006). 
16. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 89 
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., Bedford Books 1995) (1914). 
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 892 
(1986) (describing a Jeffersonian conception of the purposes of the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of expression). 
18. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (access to 
preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984) 
(access to voir dire of prospective jurors in criminal trials); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 
457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (access to testimony of juvenile victim of sex crime); Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (access to criminal trials). 
19. For an argument that a First Amendment presumption of openness should apply to 
meetings of local governmental bodies, see generally R. James Assaf, Note, Mr. Smith Comes 
Home: The Constitutional Presumption of Openness in Local Legislative Meetings, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 227 (1989). 
20. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 12–13; Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 508; Globe Newspaper, 457 
U.S. at 606; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571; id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
21. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572. 
22. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604–05; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 
(1979). 
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can promote greater appreciation for the political skills needed to 
promote effective governance.  This in turn can stimulate more 
knowledgeable public consideration of these issues and perhaps even 
encourage individual citizens to come forward with constructive 
suggestions.23 
Third, openness serves as a check against incompetence, venality, or 
bias.24  This consideration explicitly reflects the framers’ concerns with 
faction as a principal evil to be addressed in any system of effective 
government.25 
Whatever might be said for open meeting laws in principle, we 
should recognize their limitations.  To begin with, such laws do not 
require all public business to take place in public session.  All open 
meeting laws contain exceptions.26  In this sense, open meeting laws are 
analogous to the constitutional right of public access to judicial 
proceedings, which is not absolute but only qualified.  In fact, it might 
be more difficult to rebut the First Amendment presumption of access to 
the courts than it is to close all or part of a session under an open 
meeting law because many exemptions under open meeting laws are 
categorical, whereas a court must satisfy a very demanding legal 
standard to close all or part of a proceeding that is presumptively open 
to the public.27 
23. See Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383 (discussing the possibility that in public trials, 
previously unknown witnesses may come forward to testify). 
24. Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 508; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond 
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569; id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
25. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 72–73, 75 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (noting that factions cannot be prevented without infringing on the people’s liberties, 
but that factions can be controlled through appropriate institutional arrangements). 
26. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (2006) (listing exceptions to the open meeting policy); CAL. 
GOV’T CODE §§ 11122.5(c), 11126 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010) (allowing closed meetings to 
consider the appointment, employment, evaluation, or dismissal of a public employee); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 286.0113 (West 2009) (providing that meetings involving security system plans 
may be closed to the public); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/2(c) (West 2005) (providing a 
number of exceptions to the requirement that all public bodies hold open meetings); N.Y. PUB. 
OFF. LAW § 108 (McKinney 2008) (excluding from open meeting requirements judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings, the deliberations of political committees, and matters made confidential by 
state or federal law); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(D) (West Supp. 2009) (listing specific 
subjects that are exempt from a general policy of open public meetings); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§§ 551.071–.088 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (providing exceptions to the general rule that a 
public body may not consult with an attorney in private). 
27. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986) 
(holding that a preliminary hearing may not be closed “unless specific, on the record findings are 
made” showing “a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be 
prejudiced by publicity” and “reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect” the 
defendant’s rights); Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 510 (finding that the right of public access to trials 
may be defeated “only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
ENTIN, RESPONDING TO POLITICAL CORRUPTION 12/7/2010  8:42 PM 
260 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 42 
 
Further, at least some provisions of open meeting laws might run 
afoul of the First Amendment in that such laws regulate the content of 
speech by government officials.  Specifically, these laws forbid a 
majority of a multi-member body from discussing public business 
except in public sessions.  Private communications violate open meeting 
laws.  A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, in Rangra v. Brown,28 held that a provision of the Texas Open 
Meeting Act that authorized criminal sanctions for statutory violations29 
should be assessed under strict scrutiny because that provision was a 
content-based regulation of official speech.30  The full court set the case 
for rehearing en banc,31 but subsequently ordered it dismissed as moot 
because the plaintiff’s term in office had expired.32 
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the 
constitutionality of open meeting laws,33 several lower courts have held 
that elected officials have First Amendment rights that afford them 
constitutional protection in voting on public business.  For example, in 
Miller v. Town of Hull,34 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit affirmed a ruling that a town council had violated the First 
Amendment by removing members of the local redevelopment authority 
in a dispute over a proposed housing project for the elderly.  The court 
had “no difficulty” in concluding that “the act of voting on public issues 
by a member of a public agency” implicated the constitutional right to 
freedom of speech, a conclusion buttressed by the fact that the members 
of the redevelopment authority were elected as required by state law.35 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest”); Globe Newspaper, 457 
U.S. at 606–07 (holding that closure of courtroom during testimony of juvenile victim of sex 
offense requires a showing that “the denial [of public access] is necessitated by a compelling 
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest”). 
28. 566 F.3d 515 (5th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 576 F.3d 531 (5th Cir.), dismissed as 
moot, 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009). 
29. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.144. 
30. Rangra, 566 F.3d at 521. 
31. Rangra, 576 F.3d at 532. 
32. Rangra, 584 F.3d at 207; id. at 209 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
33. The Supreme Court has held that candidates for elective office have free speech rights.  
See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that a rule 
forbidding candidates for elected judicial offices from announcing their views on controversial 
legal issues violated the First Amendment); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 137 (1966) (holding 
that a state legislature could not exclude a newly elected representative from membership in the 
legislature on the basis of the representative’s prior criticisms of American foreign and military 
policy). 
34. 878 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1989). 
35. Id. at 532. 
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Similarly, in Clarke v. United States,36 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that an official’s 
vote was “inherently expressive” and therefore protected by the First 
Amendment.37  Accordingly, the court invalidated a congressional rider 
conditioning the annual federal appropriation for the District of 
Columbia on the D.C. Council’s exempting religious and religiously 
affiliated educational institutions from a gay rights ordinance.38  As in 
Rangra, this dispute ultimately was mooted.  The appropriations bill to 
which the rider was attached expired at the end of the fiscal year, and 
Congress preempted the issue by directly enacting an exemption to the 
D.C. gay rights ordinance for religious and religiously affiliated 
educational institutions.39 
Finally, in Wrzeski v. City of Madison,40 the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin enjoined the enforcement 
of a municipal ordinance prohibiting city council members who were 
present at a meeting from abstaining on any vote.  Under the ordinance, 
a member who refused to vote “aye” or “no” was subject to censure 
and, for a repeat offense, to a $100 fine.41  The court reasoned that this 
ordinance compelled a member to speak when she did not want to do 
so, and that the city was unlikely to demonstrate a compelling interest in 
support of its requirement.42  Because any proposal needed an absolute 
majority to succeed, prohibiting abstentions would not prevent the 
council from functioning.43  Moreover, constituents who objected to a 
representative’s unwillingness to take a clear position could vote out the 
vacillator at the next election.44 
To be sure, there are cases pointing in the other direction.  For 
instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
summarily rebuffed a First Amendment defense in United States v. City 
of Yonkers.45  In Yonkers, members of the city council were held in 
36. 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot en banc, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
37. Id. at 411, 413. 
38. Id. at 417 (concluding that the rider was invalid “under any standard of First Amendment 
review” (emphasis added)).  The rider was enacted in response to a judicial ruling that the D.C. 
gay rights ordinance applied to Georgetown University.  Id. at 405. 
39. Clarke, 915 F.2d at 700. 
40. 558 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Wis. 1983). 
41. Id. at 665. 
42. Id. at 667–68. 
43. Id. at 668 & n.4. 
44. Id. at 668.  Nor was the abstention ban saved by another ordinance that allowed members 
of the council to explain the reasons for their vote.  Id. at 669. 
45. 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 
493 U.S. 265 (1990). 
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contempt for refusing to enact measures to remedy housing and school 
segregation.46  The Second Circuit concluded that any First Amendment 
interest that the officials might have possessed in refusing to vote for 
the remedial measures was overridden by the public interest in securing 
compliance with judicial orders to correct the city’s failure to comply 
with the Constitution.47  The Supreme Court ultimately set aside the 
contempt findings against the officials without reaching the First 
Amendment issues, holding that the district court had abused its 
discretion in finding the individual defendants in contempt; it sufficed 
to impose harsh fines on the city for its failure to comply with the 
remedial order.48 
Similarly, an expansive reading of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos49 might support the notion that elected officials 
have no First Amendment rights in connection with their discussion of 
public business.  Garcetti held that “public employees [who] make 
statements pursuant to their official duties . . . are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes” and so enjoy no constitutional 
protections for their speech.50  Applying this limited view of public 
employee speech rights to elected officials (and high-level appointed 
officials such as agency heads and commissioners) would obviate any 
First Amendment concerns about open meeting laws, but it is far from 
clear that these persons should be viewed as public employees.  Elected 
officials, in particular, are not mere employees, but rather exercise 
political authority for which they are directly accountable to the 
voters.51 
Assuming that the Rangra court was correct in concluding that at 
least some open meeting laws raise First Amendment issues, let us 
consider whether those provisions could withstand a constitutional 
challenge.  With no Supreme Court precedent directly on point, we 
46. Id. at 451. 
47. Id. at 457. 
48. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 280.  The First Amendment issues in Yonkers were complicated by 
the fact that the city had entered into a consent decree, which the city council explicitly approved, 
that agreed to implement the remedial order.  Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 448; LISA BELKIN, SHOW ME 
A HERO: A TALE OF MURDER, SUICIDE, RACE, AND REDEMPTION 28–34 (1999). 
49. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
50. Id. at 421. 
51. See Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 523–26 (5th Cir.) (discussing Supreme Court cases 
that address the protection of elected officials’ free speech rights, and noting that the public has 
the power to hire and fire elected officials), reh’g en banc granted, 576 F.3d 531 (5th Cir.), 
dismissed as moot, 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009).  For a detailed critique of the elected-official-as-
employee theory, see Christopher J. Diehl, Note, Open Meetings and Closed Mouths: Elected 
Officials’ Free Speech Rights After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010). 
ENTIN, RESPONDING TO POLITICAL CORRUPTION 12/7/2010  8:42 PM 
2011] Responding to Political Corruption 263 
 
might turn to an analogous area of regulation of the political process: 
campaign finance law.  The interests served by open meeting laws—
preventing officials from acting in their private interest and reducing the 
risk of factional influence52—are similar to the interests advanced in 
support of campaign finance regulation. 
In a line of cases beginning with Buckley v. Valeo,53 the Supreme 
Court has found that “the prevention of corruption and the appearance 
of corruption” constitute a compelling governmental interest.54  The 
Buckley Court held that this anti-corruption interest could justify 
restrictions on the amount of individual political contributions,55 but 
this interest could not justify restrictions on independent expenditures.56  
The recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission57 appears to have narrowed the nature of the anti-
corruption interest that can support campaign finance regulations.  The 
majority opinion repeatedly emphasizes that only quid pro quo 
corruption—political favors resulting from campaign money—can 
justify campaign finance restrictions.58  Citizens United therefore might 
undermine a general anti-corruption rationale for open meeting laws.  
Absent a fairly direct link between closed meetings and self-interested 
decision-making, open meeting laws might impermissibly restrict the 
speech of public officials by preventing them from communicating with 
each other in private. 
It is not clear, however, that the Rangra panel was correct in 
concluding that open meeting laws should trigger strict scrutiny.  After 
all, open meeting laws are not viewpoint-based regulations.  The 
requirement of public discussion of official business applies across the 
board, regardless of opinion or political affiliation.  In other words, 
open meeting laws do regulate the content of officials’ speech, but they 
do so in a viewpoint-neutral way.  They are, in short, subject-matter 
regulations.  Because open meeting laws are not designed to distort 
political debate or to favor one side of controversial public issues—
indeed, they are meant to promote public discussion and political 
accountability—perhaps they should be evaluated under a less 
52. See supra text accompanying note 17 (explaining that open meetings promote the 
constitutional values of encouraging elected officials to act in the public interest and permitting 
citizens to participate in the political process). 
53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
54. Id. at 25–26. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 47–48. 
57. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
58. Id. at 908–10. 
ENTIN, RESPONDING TO POLITICAL CORRUPTION 12/7/2010  8:42 PM 
264 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 42 
 
demanding First Amendment standard.59  The Supreme Court might 
reject this suggestion, if its campaign finance jurisprudence is any 
guide.  After all, the prohibition on corporate expenditures in candidate 
elections that was at the heart of the Citizens United decision was 
viewpoint-neutral as well; the ban applied across the board and 
prevented companies from spending their own funds to promote or 
oppose candidates for public office.  Although the regulation was based 
on subject matter rather than viewpoint, the Court nevertheless 
subjected it to strict scrutiny.60 
Entirely apart from whether open meeting laws can withstand a First 
Amendment challenge, we should consider the effectiveness of such 
measures in achieving their goals of preventing self-interested decision 
making by public officials and enhancing citizens’ engagement with 
civic affairs.  Assessments of open meeting laws have not specifically 
addressed the extent to which those laws affect the incidence of 
corruption, but they do suggest that mandatory public decision making 
has costs as well as benefits.  Although such laws have enhanced public 
access to information,61 they might have harmed the quality of decision 
making.  For example, commentators and analysts have suggested that 
government bodies that are subject to open meeting laws tend to hold 
fewer official meetings and to engage in less discussion of matters in 
those meetings; officials depend more on their staff members because 
open meeting laws do not cover conversations between officials and 
their staff; and many decisions are made by notational voting (a system 
under which matters are approved without a meeting through seriatim 
consideration of decisional memoranda, a practice originally intended 
for routine items but sometimes used for other matters).62  Having 
considered the anti-corruptive effects and First Amendment 
implications of open meeting laws, this paper turns now to a discussion 
of the relationship between term limits and corruption. 
59. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The 
Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978) (discussing how the 
Supreme Court evaluates restrictions on speech related to subjects such as partisan politics). 
60. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (describing the “strict scrutiny” review of laws that 
“would suppress [political speech], whether by design or inadvertence”). 
61. David M. Welborn et al., The Federal Government in the Sunshine Act and Agency 
Decision Making, 20 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 465, 482 (1989). 
62. See, e.g., Kathy Bradley, Note, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine 
Act: Its Objectives, Goals and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 481–85 
(1997) (evaluating the costs of the Sunshine Act); Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed 
Minds: Another Road to the Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 20–29 (2004) (explaining the 
negative aspects of open meetings, drawing in part on the author’s experience as a member of the 
Federal Communications Commission); Welborn et al., supra note 61, at 471–75 (discussing the 
perceived effects of the Sunshine Act). 
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B.  Term Limits 
Term limits have been promoted as a way to reform government by 
forcing turnover in office.  Proponents contend that this will reduce or 
eliminate careerism, bring more citizens into office who will return to 
the private sector after a relatively short period of public service, and 
promote more effective government.63  The Supreme Court held that 
states may not impose term limits on members of Congress,64 but 
nearly half the states adopted such measures for state legislat
As with open meeting laws, studies of the impact of term limits have 
not specifically addressed questions of corruption.  Those studies, which 
have focused on state legislatures and mostly in the first decade (or less) 
of term limits, generally find that term limits are associated with 
increased power for legislative staff and executive officials at the 
expense of individual legislators and the legislature as a whole; less 
individual expertise and shorter time horizons on the part of legislators; 
63. See, e.g., JAMES K. COYNE & JOHN H. FUND, CLEANING HOUSE: AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN 
FOR TERM LIMITS 10–12, 18–19, 120–24 (1992) (explaining that term limits work in many other 
occupations and will attract many talented people to run for public office); Paul Jacob, From the 
Voters with Care, in THE POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS 27, 29–38 (Edward H. Crane & 
Roger Pilon eds., 1994) (discussing how term limits rejuvenate the election process and restore a 
citizen legislature); Mark P. Petracca, Restoring “The University in Rotation”: An Essay in 
Defense of Term Limitation, in THE POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS, supra, at 57, 68, 73 
(defending term limits on the grounds that they assure accountability in politics and prevent the 
professionalization of legislative politics).  See generally GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: 
CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS, AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1992) (arguing 
that term limits can help restore respect and competence to Congress). 
64. U.S. Terms Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837–38 (1995). 
65. At present, fifteen states have term limits for state legislators.  Between 1990 and 2000, 
twenty-one states adopted such limits.  State supreme courts invalidated four of those measures, 
and two others have been repealed.  No term limits for state legislators have been adopted since 
2000.  See Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, The Term Limited States, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
Default.aspx?TabId=14844 (last updated June 2009) (listing states that currently have term limits 
and those in which term limits have been repealed). 
 Term limits for local officials have fared inconsistently in the courts.  Federal constitutional 
challenges have failed.  See, e.g., Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F. Supp. 587, 595 (W.D. 
Tex. 1996) (members of city council); Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816, 822 
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (members of city council), aff’d, 45 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995).  Several 
challenges based on state law have succeeded.  See, e.g., Allred v. McLoud, 31 S.W.3d 836, 839 
(Ark. 2000) (invalidating locally adopted term limits for county officials); Polis v. City of La 
Palma, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 325 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that state law preempted municipal 
term-limit ordinance); Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 823 So. 2d 86, 94–95 (Fla. 2002) (holding 
that local term limits violated the state constitution); Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 
641 N.E.2d 525, 534 (Ill. 1994) (per curiam) (finding improper a proposed constitutional 
amendment limiting terms of state legislators); Minneapolis Term Limits Coal. v. Keefe, 535 
N.W.2d 306, 309 (Minn. 1995) (concluding that term limits for city officials would violate state 
constitution); Cottrell v. Santillanes, 901 P.2d 785, 789 (N.M. Ct. App.) (finding term limits for 
members of city council inconsistent with state law), cert. denied, 900 P.2d 962 (N.M. 1995). 
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and reduced incentives for cooperation.66  Evidence about the impact of 
term limits in other respects is less negative but inconsistent.  For 
example, term-limited legislators apparently make more policy 
proposals than do those in states without term limits,67 but legislatures 
in term-limits states tend to produce less innovative policies.68  
Similarly, the demographic composition of legislatures has not changed 
much in states that have adopted term limits.69 
Whatever the impact of term limits on the quality of public policy-
making, we lack reliable information about whether they can reduce or 
prevent corruption.  By requiring turnover in office, such limits might 
reduce the power of officials that may tempt them into corrupt 
arrangements.  On the other hand, by shortening officials’ time 
horizons, term limits might make corruption or self-dealing more 
attractive as officials would have to think about what to do when term 
limits force them from office.  Regardless, it seems unlikely that the 
extent of term limits at the state level will change any time soon; no 
new term limits have been adopted since 2000,70 and efforts to repeal or 
modify term limits in the states that have them have generally failed.71  
Thus, term limits are unlikely to be adopted on a sufficiently wide scale 
to reduce political corruption even if they do in fact promote official 
integrity. 
II.  PROSECUTION 
If corruption cannot be prevented, it should be punished.  Prosecuting 
corrupt officials poses a variety of institutional challenges.  At the state 
level, for example, prosecutorial authority is often divided.  The 
66. See, e.g., JOHN M. CAREY ET AL., TERM LIMITS IN THE STATE LEGISLATURES 124–29 
(2000) (studying the negative and positive effects of term limits); THAD KOUSSER, TERM LIMITS 
AND THE DISMANTLING OF STATE LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM 205–12 (2005) (detailing the 
advantages of legislative professionalism); MARJORIE SARBAUGH-THOMPSON ET AL., THE 
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TERM LIMITS 185–98 (2004) (evaluating the goals 
of term limits and whether or not they were achieved).  For the views of a former state legislator 
who initially supported term limits but now opposes them (apparently for reasons that do not 
include a thwarted political career), see Robert W. Naylor, The Good and the Bad of Term Limits, 
2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y art. 8 (2010), available at http://www.bepress.com/cjpp/vol2/iss1/8 (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
67. See CAREY ET AL., supra note 66, at 124–25 (pointing out that newcomers in term-limit 
states spend more time promoting their own legislation). 
68. Id. at 124; KOUSSER, supra note 66, at 207. 
69. CAREY ET AL., supra note 66, at 123–24; KOUSSER, supra note 66, at 205. 
70. See Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 65 (listing states with term limits). 
71. See Carol S. Weissert & Karen Halperin, The Paradox of Term Limit Support: To Know 
Them Is NOT to Love Them, 60 POL. RES. Q. 516, 516 (2007) (detailing examples of states that 
have tried to amend or eliminate term limits provisions and have failed). 
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attorney general typically does not initiate criminal cases.  That 
authority usually rests with a local district attorney.  At the federal level, 
the attorney general might sign off on decisions to file corruption 
charges, but the primary authority for prosecution rests with the U.S. 
attorney for the district in which the charges are laid.  Corruption cases 
are, to put it mildly, politically sensitive.  District attorneys might 
hesitate to go after local officials with whom they have personal and 
political relationships, and U.S. attorneys are not immune from political 
pressure, as the controversy over the dismissal of several federal 
prosecutors during the second term of President George W. Bush 
attests.  For these reasons, some special arrangements have been 
devised to investigate and prosecute political corruption.  This section 
will discuss some of these special mechanisms at both federal and state 
levels. 
A.  The Rise and Fall of the Independent Counsel 
The Watergate scandal, which began when operatives of President 
Nixon’s reelection campaign were arrested for breaking into the 
Democratic National Committee headquarters and ultimately implicated 
officials close to Nixon and even the chief executive himself, led to the 
appointment of a special prosecutor.  The first special prosecutor, 
Archibald Cox, was fired at President Nixon’s direction.  The ensuing 
political firestorm led to the appointment of a second special prosecutor, 
Leon Jaworski, who went to the Supreme Court to enforce a subpoena 
leading to the release of crucial evidence that led to Nixon’s 
resignation.72 
The controversy over the firing of Cox as the first Watergate special 
prosecutor led to the enactment of the independent counsel provisions 
of the Ethics in Government Act.73  The Supreme Court, over a 
vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, upheld the constitutionality of the 
independent counsel law in Morrison v. Olson.74  That law worked as 
72. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 716 (1974).  There is an enormous literature about 
the Watergate scandal.  For a well-regarded account by a prominent historian, see generally 
STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE (1990). 
73. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–73 (1978) (amended 1983, renewed 1988, 
expired 1992, reenacted 1994, expired 1999); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 527 (D.C. Cir.) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see also KEN 
GORMLEY, THE DEATH OF AMERICAN VIRTUE: CLINTON VS. STARR 95 (2010) (detailing 
Kenneth Starr’s role as a special prosecutor in the investigation of President Bill Clinton); 
KUTLER, supra note 72, at 581–82 (describing the dismissal of Archibald Cox as special 
prosecutor and the ensuing battle between President Nixon and Congress over the independence 
of the special prosecutor). 
74. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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follows: The Attorney General, on receipt of information suggesting 
that the President, other high-ranking executive officials, or high-level 
officials of the President’s political campaign had committed a serious 
federal crime, had up to ninety days to determine whether there were 
“no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is 
warranted.”75  Otherwise, the Attorney General was to inform a special 
division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit of the situation.76  The special division would then 
appoint an independent counsel, who would exercise powers that 
otherwise belonged to the Department of Justice.77  An independent 
counsel could be removed from office only for cause and only by the 
Attorney General.78 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion rejected claims that the 
independent counsel law violated the Appointments Clause, infringed 
on presidential power, and ran afoul of general principles of separation 
of powers.79  First, the independent counsel could be appointed by the 
special division because she was an inferior officer—the Appointments 
Clause authorizes Congress to “vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”80  This was because the 
independent counsel was subject to removal by a higher-level executive 
official (the Attorney General), exercised limited duties, and had limited 
jurisdiction and tenure.81  Moreover, there was no incongruity in 
vesting the appointment in the special division, which was precluded 
from hearing any matters brought by an independent counsel, as the 
statute sought to avoid conflicts of interest in the executive branch, so 
conferring the power on that court was entirely sensible.82 
Second, the removal procedure—under which the independent 
counsel could be removed only by the Attorney General and only for 
cause—was constitutionally permissible.83  Congress did not reserve for 
itself any role in removal and conferred that power on a high-level 
executive official who was directly accountable to the President.84  The 
75. Id. at 660–61. 
76. Id. at 661. 
77. Id. at 661–62. 
78. Id. at 663. 
79. Id. at 696–97. 
80. Id. at 672; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
81. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72. 
82. Id. at 676–77. 
83. Id. at 691. 
84. Id. at 686. 
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cause requirement was also constitutionally permissible because it did 
not “unduly trammel[] on executive authority.”85 
Third, the statute was consistent with the overall scheme of 
separation of powers embodied in the Constitution.  Congress had not 
sought to aggrandize power for itself at the expense of the President;86 
the law did not permit the judiciary to exercise power that properly 
belonged to the executive branch;87 and it gave the executive enough 
control over the independent counsel to permit the President to exercise 
his constitutional duties.88 
Justice Scalia strenuously dissented, lamenting what he characterized 
as the demise of “our former constitutional system.”89  Detailed 
consideration of his argument is beyond the scope of this paper.90  Two 
more recent decisions affecting Morrison’s continuing vitality deserve 
mention, however.  Some language in Edmond v. United States91 might 
raise questions about Morrison’s analysis of the independent counsel’s 
status as an inferior officer.  Edmond addressed the constitutionality of 
the Secretary of Transportation’s appointment of civilian members of 
the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals.  In the course of 
concluding that those persons were inferior officers, Justice Scalia 
wrote for the Court, explaining that “the term ‘inferior officer’ connotes 
a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the 
President: Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he 
has a superior.”92  As Justice Souter explained in his concurring 
opinion, this analysis is not entirely consistent with Morrison’s 
approach to the question: in Morrison, the Court focused on factors 
beyond whether the independent counsel had a nominal superior to 
determine whether she was an inferior officer.93 
85. Id. at 691. 
86. Id. at 694. 
87. Id. at 695. 
88. Id. at 696. 
89. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
90. For more detailed analysis of both opinions in Morrison, see, for example, Jonathan L. 
Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 175, 201–06 (1990) (summarizing and explicating the reasoning behind Morrison v. 
Olson). 
91. 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
92. Id. at 662. 
93. Id. at 667–68 (Souter, J., concurring).  Some commentators have noted the apparent 
tension between Morrison and Edmond.  See, e.g., Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still 
Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 
1107 (1998) (suggesting that Morrison’s Appointments Clause holding is ripe for reconsideration 
in light of Edmond); Andrew Croner, Essay, Morrison, Edmond, and the Power of Appointments, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1002, 1003 (2009) (arguing that the term “Officers of the United States” 
ENTIN, RESPONDING TO POLITICAL CORRUPTION 12/7/2010  8:42 PM 
270 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 42 
 
The recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board94 used the Edmond analysis to uphold a 
key provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act95 that created a new agency 
(the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) to register 
accounting firms, establish substantive and ethical accounting standards, 
and investigate registered accounting firms.  Members of the Board are 
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in consultation 
with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
and the Secretary of the Treasury.96  The Court had “no hesitation” 
about concluding that, “under Edmond,” these officials “are inferior 
officers” and that their appointment by the SEC was constitutionally 
permissible.97 
The Edmond approach, endorsed in Free Enterprise Fund, might 
imply that the Court would find a violation of the Appointments Clause 
in the independent counsel law if Morrison had arisen today rather than 
a quarter-century ago.  This approach suggests that the independent 
counsel might not be an inferior officer for lack of a sufficiently close 
relationship with high executive branch officials.  The Free Enterprise 
Fund Court had no occasion to address this question, but that case 
probably will not be the last word on the subject.  Chief Justice Roberts 
explained in the second paragraph of the majority opinion that “[t]he 
parties d[id] not ask us to reexamine” Morrison, so the Court “d[id] not 
do so.”98  This statement does not preclude a subsequent effort to 
overrule Morrison.  Indeed, the dissenting opinion in the court of 
appeals invited the Supreme Court to revisit the independent counsel 
ruling in Free Enterprise Fund.99 
In a very important sense, Morrison’s continuing vitality does not 
matter very much.  The independent counsel law was often 
is a term intended to have substantive meaning). 
94. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7219 (2006). 
96. Id. § 7211(e)(4)(A). 
97. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162.  Justice Breyer, who dissented from the Court’s 
holding that the statutory restrictions on the SEC’s power to remove Board members violated the 
Constitution and therefore had to be excised, agreed with the majority’s analysis of the Board 
members’ status as inferior officers.  Id. at 3164 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 3147 (majority opinion). 
99. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 696–97 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), on which Morrison partially relied, “have long been criticized by 
many as inconsistent with the text of the Constitution, with the understanding of the text that 
largely prevailed from 1789 through 1935, and with prior precedents” but adding that “we cannot, 
need not, and do not relitigate those two cases here” because, “[f]or this [lower] Court, those 
cases are binding precedents”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
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controversial.  To finesse objections, the law contained a sunset 
provision that required its periodic reauthorization.  After being 
reauthorized in 1983 and 1988, it lapsed in 1992 but was reauthorized in 
1994 as the Whitewater scandal broke around President Clinton.  
Kenneth Starr was appointed independent counsel, and the storm over 
his performance led to the law’s almost completely unlamented 
expiration in 1999.100  It seems extremely unlikely that this or any 
similar statute will have sufficient political support to be enacted in the 
foreseeable future.  The political demise of the independent counsel law 
suggests the difficulty of crafting special institutions to deal with 
political corruption and raises the question whether traditional 
arrangements in the Department of Justice and at the state and local 
level, as imperfect as they might be, could be at least as effective as 
innovations that turn out badly in practice. 
B.  The Limits of State Ethics Commissions 
Meanwhile, a number of states have created special procedures for 
handling allegations of official misconduct.  Among these are ethics 
commissions charged with enforcing conflict of interest rules to reduce 
the risk of corruption.  Two recent judicial rulings that took a restrictive 
view of the authority of ethics commissions suggest the limitations of 
this approach to dealing with corruption. 
In Commission on Ethics v. Hardy,101 the Nevada Supreme Court 
held that the ethics commission lacked constitutional authority to 
investigate allegations that a state senator violated the conflict of 
interest law by voting for legislation that benefited members of a 
building contractors’ association of which he served as president and 
not disclosing the connection between the bill and its effect on the 
group’s members.102  The court first noted that the Nevada Constitution 
explicitly forbids any branch of state government from “exercis[ing] 
any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases 
expressly directed or permitted in this constitution.”103  Of particular 
significance, the state constitution gives the legislature the power to 
100. See GORMLEY, supra note 73, at 95–96, 655–56 (pointing out that Kenneth Starr’s 
prosecutorial overzealousness and lack of self restraint buried the independent counsel law); 
KUTLER, supra note 72, at 582–84 (describing practical and constitutional criticisms of the 
independent prosecutor prior to Morrison v. Olson); PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND 
BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 170–71 (rev. 10th ed. 2003). 
101. 212 P.3d 1098 (Nev. 2009) (per curiam). 
102. Id. at 1100–01 & n.1. 
103. Id. at 1104 (quoting NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1(1)). 
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discipline its members for “disorderly conduct.”104  This power to 
discipline members may not be delegated.105  Any investigation or 
discipline related to a member’s core legislative function of voting on 
bills, therefore, must be undertaken by the legislature itself.  Because 
any disclosure of conflicts of interest in connection with pending bills 
relates to this core function, only that branch may discipline a member 
for failure to disclose.106  As an executive agency, the ethics 
commission could not take any action in connection with the senator’s 
voting on the bill about which he had a conflict of interest.107 
Some of the language in the Nevada court’s opinion seems to suggest 
that an expansive definition of “disorderly conduct” could preclude the 
prosecution of a legislator for soliciting or accepting a bribe in 
connection with her vote.  After all, the attorney general or the district 
attorney who might investigate and try any bribery charge exercises 
executive power.  On this view, allowing a criminal case to go forward 
would undermine the express protection of separation of powers in the 
state constitution.  We should hesitate to read the case so broadly, 
however, because the court did not discuss or even hint at this 
possibility.  Nor did the court allude to the definition of disorderly 
conduct except to observe that violations of conflict of interest rules 
represented a species of disorderly conduct.  The other recent case 
reached a similar conclusion but on narrower grounds that rules out the 
potential immunity for a legislator who seeks or accepts a bribe in 
connection with a vote on a bill. 
Just a month before the Nevada ruling, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court, in Irons v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission,108 held that 
legislative immunity protected a former president of the state senate 
from prosecution on charges that he had voted against a proposal to 
allow consumers to choose where to have their prescriptions filled when 
he privately represented a major pharmacy retailer and a leading health 
insurance company that would be affected by the proposal.109  The 
decision relied on the Speech in Debate Clause of the state 
constitution.110  Invoking earlier decisions that construed this provision 
expansively, the court emphasized that the legislative privilege was “a 
104. Id. (quoting NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 6). 
105. Id. at 1105. 
106. Id. at 1106–07. 
107. Id. at 1108. 
108. 973 A.2d 1124 (R.I. 2009). 
109. Id. at 1134. 
110. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (“For any speech in debate in either house, no member shall be 
questioned in any other place.”). 
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venerable and important product of historical travails in England” that 
“was most definitely embraced by this country” following the 
Revolution and was expressly reaffirmed when the voters had ratified a 
revision of the state constitution in 1986.111  The privilege protects the 
people by allowing their representatives to do their work without 
improper interference from the executive and judicial branches.112  
Moreover, a constitutional amendment establishing the ethics 
commission did not supersede legislative immunity because there was 
no evidence that the amendment “was intended to abrogate speech-in-
debate immunity.”113  Because this amendment was approved by the 
voters at the same time that they endorsed a general revision of the rest 
of the constitution that was not intended to have substantive 
significance and the amendment did not explicitly suggest any 
limitation of legislative immunity, the expansive reading of the Speech 
in Debate Clause remained appropriate.114 
Despite its broad construction of this provision, the court emphasized 
that the immunity was not absolute.  The opinion explicitly remarked 
that the Speech in Debate Clause did not protect legislators from 
prosecution for “solicitation and acceptance of bribes” as well as for 
other “criminal activities, even those committed to further legislative 
activity.”115  In support of this observation, the Rhode Island court 
invoked cases construing the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which contains language that is functionally identical to 
the state provision.116  A careful reading of those cases should lead to 
some qualification of the broad language in the Irons opinion. 
Although it is accurate to say that members of Congress may be 
prosecuted for soliciting or accepting bribes, only certain kinds of 
evidence may be used to prove the crime.  In United States v. 
Brewster,117 the Supreme Court held that a former Senator could be 
prosecuted for seeking and taking payments in exchange for votes on 
postal rate legislation.118  The Court reasoned that “the Speech or 
Debate Clause prohibits inquiry only into those things generally said or 
done in the House or the Senate in the performance of official duties 
111. Irons, 973 A.2d at 1130. 
112. Id. at 1131. 
113. Id. at 1133. 
114. Id. at 1134. 
115. Id. at 1131. 
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators 
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”). 
117. 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
118. Id. at 528–29. 
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and into the motivation for those acts.”119  In this instance, the 
government had to prove only that Brewster sought and accepted the 
bribes; the prosecutor did not have to establish that the Senator 
performed any legislative act in conformity with his promise.120  This 
point was underscored in United States v. Helstoski,121 which held that 
the government could not use evidence of past legislative actions by a 
member of Congress in a bribery prosecution.122  Helstoski, a former 
Representative, was indicted for taking money to introduce private bills 
to suspend deportation orders against immigrants who wanted to remain 
in this country.123  Although the Speech or Debate Clause precluded the 
introduction of evidence of past legislative actions, which undoubtedly 
would make bribery cases more difficult to prove,124 the prosecution 
was free to use evidence of promises to perform future acts in exchange 
for illicit payments.125 
In short, constitutional protections for legislators might complicate 
the process of forcing those officials who engage in bribery—probably 
the quintessential form of personal corruption—to account for their 
misdeeds.  Keep in mind, however, that Hardy and Irons involved 
claims of conflict of interest—another form of conduct that promotes 
private gain at the expense of the public interest.  Although the analysis 
of the Nevada and Rhode Island courts differed in certain respects, both 
cases suggest that only legislative bodies may enforce conflict of 
interest rules against their members.  Of course, legislators are not the 
only officials who engage in corruption, but the prospects for vigorous 
enforcement of conflict of interest rules by legislatures against their 
own members do not seem very promising, at least if the pace of recent 
congressional investigations is any indication.126 
119. Id. at 512. 
120. Id. at 526. 
121. 442 U.S. 477 (1979). 
122. Id. at 494. 
123. Id. at 479. 
124. Id. at 487–88. 
125. Id. at 489. 
126. See, e.g., Erich Lichtblau, Congressional Ethics Inquiries Drag On, Despite Vows to End 
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at A21 (explaining how Congress has struggled to police 
itself even when its ethics committees were labeled as ineffectual).  Recently, nearly two dozen 
House members co-sponsored a resolution to prevent the new Office of Congressional Ethics 
from initiating investigations without a sworn complaint from someone with personal knowledge 
of alleged wrongdoing and from releasing public statements about complaints for which it 
recommends dismissal.  The resolution has drawn criticism from those who believe that these 
changes would make it more difficult to promote higher standards of conduct in Congress.  See 
Eric Lipton, 20 in Black Caucus Ask for Curbs on Ethics Office, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at 
A17 (explaining the details of the proposed legislation and its drawbacks); Fudge Factor; A 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
Readers who have persevered to this point should not take these 
comments as a sign of despair.  The task of preventing and punishing 
corruption presents daunting challenges, but we should put those 
challenges into perspective.  I want to conclude with a seemingly 
paradoxical observation: corruption, at least to some extent, might 
actually serve some socially useful functions. 
Earlier I quoted Madison’s recognition of the fallibility of 
humanity.127  More than a decade before Madison wrote, a member of 
the Continental Congress warned: “It is prudent not to put Virtue to too 
serious a Test. I would use American Virtue, as sparingly as possible 
lest We wear it out.”128  Both of these views take certain forms of 
behavior as all too common and therefore undesirable.  Of course, crime 
and corruption fit into that category.  But can they be eliminated?  
Should they be eradicated? 
Most lawyers, indeed most people, believe that the answer to those 
questions is indubitably yes.  Emile Durkheim, the great French 
sociologist, suggested a more nuanced response.  Durkheim argued that 
crime occurs in all societies and that it is simultaneously “an inevitable 
though regrettable phenomenon” and “an integrative element in any 
healthy society.”129  Crime elicits widespread indignation and 
reinforces social norms about appropriate behavior.  “From all the 
similar impressions exchanged and all the different expressions of wrath 
there rises up a single fount of anger, more or less clear-cut according to 
the particular case, anger which is that of everybody without being that 
of anybody in particular. It is public anger.”13
If Durkheim is correct, we should regard a certain degree of 
corruption as inevitable.  This does not mean, it bears emphasis, that we 
should treat corruption as appropriate.  Instead, we should recognize 
that corruption harms the body politic and that it offends our sense of 
Proposal by Rep. Marcia Fudge Would Gut the New Congressional Ethics Office, WASH. POST, 
June 4, 2010, at A18 (detailing the contents of the Fudge resolution). 
127. See supra text accompanying note 12 (“If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.”). 
128. John Adams, Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress (Oct. 5, 1775), in 2 DIARY 
AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 192, 193 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1961).  The 
speaker, John Joachim Zubly, was referring to the need for international trade, but the quotation 
has been used for broader purposes.  See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 95 (1969) (stating the doubts Americans had of the suitability of 
republicanism for their society circa 1775). 
129. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 98 (Steven Lukes ed. & 
W.D. Halls trans., 1982). 
130. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 58 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984). 
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propriety, morality, and integrity.  The fight against corruption, in other 
words, helps us gain “mutual assurance that [we] are still in unison.”131  
Corruption, by reminding us of our common interests and dominant 
values, helps us define and reinforce who we are as a society.132  But it 
can do so only if we continue to regard corruption as legally and 
morally unacceptable so that we can do our best to minimize the 
phenomenon.  Our institutions that seek to combat corruption are 
imperfect, but imperfection does not mean that the battle against 
corruption is a failure.  Perhaps we can design better institutions, but 
failure will come only when we see corruption exclusively as normal. 
131. Id. 
132. See KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 
4 (1966) (arguing that crime may actually draw people together in a common posture of anger 
and indignation, therefore developing a tighter bond of solidarity than previously existed). 
